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The Death Penalty Standard that
Won’t Die: The Georgia Supreme
Court Maintains the Highest
Possible Standard of Proof for the
Mentally Disabled
Alyssa LeDoux*
I. INTRODUCTION
Several serious issues arise when applying the death penalty to the
mentally disabled. First, the social purposes served by the death penalty,
retribution and deterrence, are questionable when it comes to the
mentally disabled.1 Retribution by execution is reserved for those at the
highest level of culpability or the highest level of conscious and depraved
guilt.2 Likewise, execution is viewed as an effective deterrent on cold
calculus that is not found in individuals with a mental disability.3
Second, challenges the disabled face, such as the tendency to falsely
confess, the lesser ability to present a persuasive showing of mitigating
factors, the lack of visible remorse, the inability to effectively assist their
counsel, and others, compromise effective litigation and expose the

*Thank you, Professor Ted Blumoff, for helping me select this fascinating and important
case and advising me through the writing of this Casenote. Also, thank you to Douglas
Comin, the Student Writing Editor, for answering my million questions and being willing
to give me hard feedback, and Zac Mullinax, my peer reviewer, for voluntarily reviewing
my work multiple times. Finally, thank you to my parents and sister Erin for being right
all along.
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2002).
2. Id. at 319.
3. Id. at 319-20. The reasoning is that higher severity of punishment will create
reluctance in those considering murderous crimes, which requires certain abilities to
logically reason, process, understand, and control impulses (abilities lacking in the
mentally disabled thereby nullify any deterrent effect). Id.
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mentally disabled to a higher risk that the death penalty will be imposed
erroneously.4
For Georgia, Young v. State5 is the most recent case dealing with
executing the mentally disabled, adding to what has been a divisive
stream of caselaw since the early 70s. Georgia mandated the protection
of the mentally disabled early on but imposed the highest standard
possible to prove that disability.6 Over the decades, jurisprudence from
the Supreme Court of the United States has made maintaining this
standard difficult, but the divided Georgia Supreme Court has held firm.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rodney Young broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home, bound her son, Gary
Jones, to a chair and beat him to death with a hammer and butcher knife,
leaving his skull fractured, his eye out of socket, and his body lying in a
pool of glass and blood.7 He was tried and convicted, and in his defense
Young claimed guilty but mentally disabled—which would, if found to be
true, disqualify him for the death penalty.8 The jury, however, was not
convinced and convicted Young of murder aggravated by burglary and
outrageous, inhumane torture showing Young’s depravity of mind.9 The
jury sentenced Young to death.10
In Georgia, to be found exempt from the death penalty due to mental
disability, the defendant needs to establish that mental disability
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”11 On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court,
the court reviewed Young’s presented testimony from staff at his old high
school showing he struggled in high school with academics and sports
and attended special education.12 Young argued in his appeal that the
standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt, is unconstitutionally high
and contradicts recent Supreme Court of the United States’s decisions
meant to protect all mentally disabled from execution.13 The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed Young’s convictions and reinforced the ruling
that currently stands in Georgia: the Georgia Constitution does not

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 320–21.
312 Ga. 71, 860 S.E.2d 746 (2021).
Id. at 88, 860 S.E.2d at 768–69.
Id. at 73, 860 S.E.2d at 759.
Id.
Id. at 122, 860 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 71, 860 S.E.2d at 758.
Id. at 74, 860 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 73, 860 S.E.2d at 759.
Id. at 90–92, 860 S.E.2d at 770–71.
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preclude requiring the mentally disabled to prove their disability beyond
reasonable doubt.14
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Criminal prosecution always bears a margin of error that risks either
letting the guilty go free or the innocent pay for a crime they did not
commit.15 The Fifth16 and Fourteenth17 Amendments to the United
States Constitution reflect the preference for the former—that no
individual should lose their liberty unless the prosecution has convinced
the factfinder of the individual’s guilt.18 The risk of convictions relying on
error is protected against by the requirement that the government prove
guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the highest standard of proof, for all
criminal proceedings.19 Beyond a reasonable doubt indicates that the
factfinder should feel the highest degree of confidence in the conviction
as opposed to feeling it is either more than likely or just possible.20
In addition, the Eighth Amendment21 declares that no cruel or unusual
punishments shall be inflicted.22 The U.S. Supreme Court in Weems v.
United States23 defined cruel and unusual to include usual punishments
dealt out excessively or disproportionately to the offense; the law limits

14. Id. at 100, 860 S.E.2d at 776.
15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370–71 (1970).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–64.
19. Id.; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
20. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–64. Thus, when evidence indicates criminal guilt it
becomes the State’s burden to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt and not the individual’s
burden to prove their innocence. Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680, 681, 724 S.E.2d 366,
368-69 (2012).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22. Id.
23. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Since Weems, “cruel and unusual” punishment has been
fleshed out to include a California statute that criminalized narcotic addiction, statutes
mandating life in prison for juveniles and denationalization. The Supreme Court ruled that
“in the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal offense of
such a disease would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 n.1, 666 (1962) (referring to California Health and Safety Code
§ 11721, which said, “No person shall . . . be addicted to the use of narcotics . . . . Any person
convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days . . . in the county jail.”); Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (holding that mandating life in prison for juveniles “prevents those
meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s ‘lessened culpability’ and greater
‘capacity for change’”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958).
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cruelties in both degree and kind.24 Specifically, the Court held that the
death penalty in itself is not cruel or unusual but can be if applied to
inappropriate circumstances.25
A. A Need for Change
In the 1950s, a change in society’s views on criminals began to spread
nationwide.26 Awareness of biological, social, and environmental
influences revealed that criminal activity is sometimes less culpable,
which put into question the deterrent and moral value of the death
penalty.27 At the same time, racial disparity in those being executed
became glaringly evident, which confirmed that the kind of arbitrary
error the Constitution is against was indeed occurring.28 The U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia29 held that the death
penalty is constitutional so long as states include ways to ensure
imposition is never arbitrary or capricious.30 Gregg’s qualification for

24. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367, 377.
25. Weems, 217 U.S. at 370-71.
26. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 208 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2003). As early as the mid-1800s and around the time strange behavior started being
attributed to natural maladies of the brain, there existed discomfort and debate about
executing the mentally disabled. BANNER, supra note 26, at 119.
27. Id. at 208-09.
28. Id. at 228–30; Addington, 441 U.S. at 425; Winship, 397 U.S. at 363–364. Courts
were put under immense pressure from other countries, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Civil
Liberties Union state legislation, juries refusing to consider execution, and an unusually
high number of habeas corpus petitions. BANNER, supra note 26, at 242, 244–48. Capital
punishment was openly opposed by famous intellectuals, politicians, and religious
organizations. Id. at 240, 241–42. Due to the pressure on the courts and public movements,
executions halted and, in Furman v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court finally addressed the
possibility of executions being random, sentenced with inappropriate motives, and violating
the Eighth Amendment. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40, 256, 305, 310 (1972).
The Court held that the way the death penalty was being carried out constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and invalidated the arbitrary application of forty states’ death penalty
statutes. Id. at 305, 312; The History of the Death Penalty: A Timeline, DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION CENTER, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/history-of-the-death-penaltytimeline (last visited Nov. 18, 2021). In reaction to the Furman ruling, most states passed
new death penalty statutes laying out factors to be weighed and other more appropriate
criteria to reduce the risk of error. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976). Gregg v.
Georgia eventually put an end to the ten-year moratorium. The History of the Death
Penalty: A Timeline, supra note 28.
29. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
30. Id. at 188, 197–98 (upholding a Georgia law that mandated individual
consideration of each crime and criminal’s circumstances before a jury can sentence an
individual to death).

2022

THE DEATH PENALTY STANDARD

1571

states required courts lower the risk by taking mental disability into
account when considering the death penalty.31
B. Legislative and Judicial Response
A decade later, the public was outraged by the execution of Jerome
Bowden, a convict from Georgia with an IQ of sixty-five.32 The jury
convicted Bowden of murder aggravated by armed robbery, aggravated
assault, and burglary.33 Bowden’s IQ tested at fifty-nine as a teenager
and testimony revealed limited mental abilities throughout his life.34
Public backlash demonstrated serious societal discomfort with the state
executing someone who appeared so clearly mentally disabled, which
caused Georgia to become the first state to outlaw execution of the
mentally disabled in 1988.35 Other states followed suit and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (the Act)36 included a national standard barring the
death sentence for certain mentally disabled people.
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the death sentence for the
mentally disabled for the first time since the Act.37 The defendant,
Johnny Penry, had the mental age of a six-year-old and the learning
ability of a nine or ten-year-old, and was sentenced to death for beating,
raping, and stabbing Pamela Carpenter in Texas.38 Penry was diagnosed
as a child with organic brain damage and had an IQ somewhere between
fifty and sixty-three, which manifested in substantial difficulty learning
as a child.39 Doctors testified that at the time of the crime his mental
disability made it virtually impossible for him to understand the
31. Id. at 164, 193–95 n.44.
32. Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of Proof for Determining
Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: How High is Too High?, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
163, 165, 168 (2015); Bowden v. State, 239 Ga. 821, 238 S.E.2d. 905 (1977).
33. Bowden, 239 Ga. at 821, 238 S.E.2d at 907.
34. Saviello, supra note 32, at 166.
35. Id. at 168, 169 n.35 (citing Bill Montgomery, Who Shall Die? The Death Penalty’s
Last Appal–Retarded Man’s Execution Stirred Protest Worldwide – Case of Jerome Bowden
Discomfits Conscience, ATL.J. AND ATL. CONST., October 13 1986, at A1) (“Virtually all
of the press coverage described Jerome Bowden as ‘retarded’ and the Atlanta Journal
Constitution, Atlanta’s major newspaper, referred to him as ‘retarded’ in virtually every
article they wrote about his case and execution.”); O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2017); Lauren
Sudeall Lucas, An Empirical Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Standard
to Determine Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2017).
36. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 690, § 7001(l), 102 Stat. 4181 (protecting
individuals who, as a result of mental disability, are unable to understand the proceedings
or cannot recognize the unlawfulness of their act); Atkins, 356 U.S. at 313–14.
37. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989).
38. Id. at 307-08.
39. Id.

1572

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

wrongfulness of his actions or to conform them to the law.40 A jury
sentenced Penry to death.41 Despite proof of organic brain damage, the
Court held it was not enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment
simply because he was mentally disabled, and affirmed his sentence.42
The same year the U.S. Supreme Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh43
that the U.S. Constitution did not protect the mentally disabled from the
death penalty, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Fleming v. Zant44 that
while the federal Constitution (and caselaw at the time) represented the
minimum protection states must afford their citizens, the Georgia
Constitution could offer more.45 Additionally, the Georgia court stated
that the new state legislation in Georgia was the clearest evidence of a
consensus in Georgia that executing the mentally disabled does not
contribute to the acceptable goals of capital punishment.46 Son Fleming
had been sentenced to death for murdering a police officer, but Fleming
had previously applied for and been granted social security disability
benefits for psychosis and organic brain damage.47 The Fleming case, the
first claim of guilty but mentally disabled death penalty case since the
new Georgia legislation, prevented the execution of Fleming, holding that
he was protected from cruel and unusual punishment as newly stated
under the Georgia Constitution.48
C. A New Standard
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court tackled the Penry question again—
whether execution of a mentally disabled individual qualified as cruel
and unusual punishment.49 Daryl Atkins was sentenced to death after
his conviction for abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder.50 Atkins
and his associates abducted Eric Nesbitt at gunpoint and forced him to
withdraw cash from an automated teller machine before shooting him to
40. Id. at 308–09.
41. Id. at 311.
42. Id. at 340. Though Penry was not found to have met the criteria, the Court agreed
that a defendant’s background and character are important considerations “because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” Id. at 319.
43. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
44. 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989).
45. Young, 312 Ga. at 87, 860 S.E.2d at 768.
46. Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 689-90, 386 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (1989).
47. Id. at 687, 386 S.E.2d at 340.
48. Id. at 691, 386 S.E.2d at 343.
49. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
50. Id.
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death.51 The forensic psychologist found Atkins mildly mentally disabled
with an IQ of fifty-nine.52 The Court in Atkins v. Virginia fully
acknowledged the dramatic social and legislative current that had
developed over the years and held that these less culpable individuals
neither deserved this serious retribution nor would be effectively
deterred by it.53 The Court ruled that due to the “gravity of the concerns
expressed by dissenters, and in the light of the dramatic shift in the state
legislative landscape[,]” taking the life of mentally disabled person is
categorically prohibited.54
Georgia courts were heavily involved in the evolution leading up to
Atkins while simultaneously wrestling with their own state resolutions.
However, upon the prohibition in Atkins, neither the Georgia legislature
nor judiciary made any procedural changes regarding the guilty but
mentally disabled plea.55 Georgia is the only state to set this high of a
standard of proof in this context and the only one to have the jury
consider mental disability for these purposes in tandem with the
consideration of the defendant’s guilt.56 The law states that the jury
should find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged and is with intellectual disability.”57 In 2013, advocates
demanded a change and presented at an informational hearing to the
House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee of the Georgia General Assembly,
urging that careless drafting—namely, tacking the finding of disability
onto the end of a sentence—resulted in the application of the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard to both guilt and a finding of disability.58
The Georgia Supreme Court has held firm, despite continual court
splits on the constitutionality of the beyond reasonable doubt threshold
to prove mental disability since its inception in Section 17-7-131 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated. But in 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court
made a critical clarification on the categorical prohibition that
compromised the Georgia court’s previous rationale and opened the
question once again, a question the Georgia Supreme Court answered in
Young v. State.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 308–09.
53. Id. at 310, 319–20 (2002).
54. Id. at 310, 321.
55. Lucas, supra note 35, at 559.
56. Id. at 560.
57. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c).
58. Lucas, supra note 35, at 561; Adam Liptak, Language Mistake in Georgia Death
Penalty Law Creates a Daunting Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/03/us/politics/supreme-court-death-penalty-intellectualdisability.html.
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IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
Young is one of many unsuccessful death penalty challenges
attempting to strike down the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
proof, but the Georgia court’s reasoning behind this decision makes this
case more significant to the claim of guilty but mentally disabled in
Georgia than any of the challenges before.59 The last time the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld the standard was in Stripling v. State.60 Young
argues the standard is unconstitutional and that the Stripling ruling is
therefore an error which should be rectified through his case.61 Instead,
the court here overrules key parts of Stripling while introducing new
justifications that reinvent the standard as a new creature, or rather, the
same creature on new legs.
The court acknowledged that while Georgia was the first to pass
legislation barring the execution of the mentally disabled, it has always
been the only state, or one of the very few, to require those prosecuted to
convince the jury of a defendant’s disability beyond a reasonable doubt.62
Regardless, the Court determined, Georgia’s early involvement showed
its inclusion in the creation of the national consensus against executing
the mentally disabled, which includes the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.63
The trend towards the national consensus the court referred to
culminated in Atkins with the final termination of executions of any
mentally disabled person because of the “dramatic shift in the state
legislative landscape” since Penry in 1989, the year after Georgia’s
standard was established.64 The U.S. Supreme Court established the
prohibition, determining that social and political climates demanded it
given the charge to “draw . . . meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”65
Those evolving standards can be traced towards tighter protection for
death row candidates with mental disabilities.66 Policies reducing the

59. Young, 312 Ga. at 88, 860 S.E.2d at 769.
60. 289 Ga. 370, 371, 711 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2011); Young, 312 Ga. at 88, 860 S.E.2d at
769.
61. Young, 312 Ga. at 87, 90, 860 S.E.2d at 768, 790.
62. Id. at 88, 860 S.E.2d at 768-69.
63. Id. at 90, 860 S.E.2d at 770.
64. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
65. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
66. According to Winship, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard protects the party
against whom the proof is offered, which is why it has been an important standard to hold
the state to in criminal proceedings. Winship, 397 U.S. at 362. However, in Georgia mental
disability death penalty cases¾where the defendant is attempting to prove mental
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risk of execution for the mentally disabled were based completely on the
rise of national awareness and rejection of erroneous death penalty
sentencing.67 All the judicial decisions, public movements, and new
legislation on this topic since the ideas started even before Winship
finally rounded out with the recognition that society is no longer
comfortable with the risk of executing any mentally disabled person and
is willing to risk lessened penalties for more deserving criminals in order
to protect that right.68
This consensus is what gives ground to Young’s complaint. The court
did not disagree with the current national values of protecting the
mentally disabled, but rather Young’s challenge to the efficaciousness of
Georgia’s implementation.69 Young made several attempts to show why
the court’s previous decisions force Georgia out of step with the national
consensus interfering with his constitutional right as a mentally disabled
disability¾the standard is ironically used against the defendant to the benefit the State
instead. This may suggest that while the standard has been in use since before Penry, it is
not in line with other states’ national consensus toward allotting capital defendants with
mental disabilities every possible protection in the law.
67. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (deciding the evolving standards of decency compels the
conclusion that the death penalty is excessive for the mentally disabled); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (stating that justice requires consideration of character and
propensities of the offender); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (stating mandatory death penalty statutes are
invalid because they neglect consideration of particular circumstances)); Moore v. Texas,
137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2014) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 705 (1990) (stating
“consensus in the States provides ‘objective indicia of society’s standards in the context of
the Eighth Amendment’”)); Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 (stating that the use of the beyond
reasonable doubt standard in criminal proceedings shows society’s concerns to minimize
risk of error in sentencing at the risk of letting someone guilty go free).
68. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. In 2005, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to forbid imposing the death penalty on children. Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). In the deciding case, Roper v. Simmons, several
teenagers planned to take a life, broke into Shirley Crook’s house, duct taped her hands
and entire face, drove her to a bridge, and pushed her into the Meramec River where she
drowned. Id. at 556–57. The instigating teen was charged with aggravated first-degree
murder that involved depravity of mind and deemed inhumane and outrageously and
wantonly vile. Id. at 557. Relying on Atkins v. Virginia and the Eighth Amendment, the
Court ruled to protect the murderous teen from the death penalty because of the low
likelihood that teenagers engage in the sort of cost-benefit analysis that assures the death
penalty would be an effective means of deterrence. Id. at 571–72. The Roper decision
repealed Stanford v. Kentucky, where the Supreme Court had refused to find a national
consensus that the death penalty for sixteen-year-olds was cruel and unusual. Id. at 574;
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). The Court decided Stanford on the same
day it decided Penry, which denied the mentally disabled categorical exemption from the
death penalty. Roper, 543 U.S. at 562. Both cases were based on the same consensus that
objectively society’s standards did not demand an alternative conclusion. Id. at 574.
69. Young, 312 Ga. at 74, 860 S.E.2d at 759–60.
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person.70 These arguments are discussed in turn below, as well as the
court’s rationale for its rejection.
A. The Substantive Mistake
Young defended his case first by attacking the substantive aspects of
the court’s decision about the standard in Stripling from 2011 because
more recent cases put those decisions in new light.71 Atkins held that
because the mentally disabled face a special risk of wrongful execution,
death is not a suitable sentence to allow a judge or jury to consider for a
mentally disabled criminal.72 In Head v. Hill,73 the Supreme Court of
Georgia held the special risks and limitations suffered by truly mentally
disabled persons that the Court in Atkins was concerned about do not
need more protection.74 Hill also held that those whose mental
deficiencies are significant enough to be provable beyond a reasonable
doubt fit the category protected by Atkins.75 In Stripling, the court added
that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is justified because it
“served to define the category of mental [disability,]” which, at the time,
was determined to be well within the constitutional purposes of the
Atkins decision.76

70. Id. at 90, 92, 869 S.E.2d at 770–71.
71. Id. at 90–91, 860 S.E.2d at 770.
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
73. 277 Ga. 255, 587 S.E.2d 613 (2003).
74. Id. at 262, 587 S.E.2d at 622. The risks of the standard, it held, are sufficiently
counterbalanced by Georgia’s procedure for demonstrating incompetency to stand trial,
which require a showing of incompetence only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The
Court in Dusky v. United States held that if the individual is capable of consulting with a
lawyer and has a rational understanding of the proceedings, they are competent and the
defense of incompetency to stand trial will not protect them. Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
75. Hill, 277 Ga. at 262, 587 S.E.2d at 622; Stripling, 289 Ga. at 374, 711 S.E.2d at
669. The habeas court determined that because Hill was mildly intellectually disabled, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard created an especially high risk for erroneous execution
because the defendant bore almost all the risk of error. Lucas, supra note 35, at 562-63. On
appeal from a decision to the contrary from the Georgia Supreme Court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the habeas court, determining that
the standard would undoubtably result in the execution of mentally disabled individuals.
Id. at 563. An en banc hearing reversed that ruling because of the lack of data to support
that claim. Id. at 563–64. Meanwhile, three of the psychologists who had testified for the
prosecution in earlier proceedings reviewed Hill’s case again and determined they were
wrong about their conclusion of Hill’s lack of mental disability. Id. at 564–65. Warren Hill
was executed January 27, 2015. Id. at 565.
76. Stripling, 289 Ga. at 373, 711 S.E.2d at 668 (second emphasis added).
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However, in 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the Atkins holding
in response to Texas and Florida’s procedures being too rigid, arbitrary,
and failing to protect the mildly mentally disabled. Moore v. Texas77
established that the Atkins decision was meant to shield all the mentally
disabled from the death penalty and that courts could not define mental
disability but rather “must be ‘informed by the medical community’s
diagnostic framework[.]’”78 The clarification in Moore meant that courts
using their procedures to define mental disability infringes on
constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment.79 Young
argued that this clarification undermined the Georgia court’s substantive
use, as stated in Stripling, of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.80
The court in Young acknowledged all these facts and stated, referring to
the offending statements in Stripling and Hill, “[a]ccordingly, we
disapprove anything in our prior decisions suggesting otherwise,
particularly those parts of our prior decisions suggesting that ‘Georgia’s
beyond a reasonable doubt standard further served to define the category
of mental [disability,]’” effectively overruling Hill and Stripling on this
point.81 But the court’s analysis of the substantive mistake ends there.82
B. Purely Procedural
In regard to procedural problems with the standard, Young next
argued: (1) that the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Moore v. Texas and
Hall v. Florida83 require the court’s disapproval of more than just how
the standard of proof has been applied substantively but the procedural
standard itself, and (2) that proving mental disability is more

77. 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2014).
78. Id. at 1048.
79. Id. at 1044.
80. Young, 312 Ga. at 90–91, 860 S.E.2d at 770.
81. Id.
82. The court in Young disapproved of using the standard substantively to define
mental disability, which Stripling and Hill showed Georgia has been doing even after the
Atkins decision. Id. at 91, 860 S.E.2d at 770. Instead, the court declared that the standard
should be used procedurally to provide a construct for the jury to determine if an
intellectual disability exists at all, according to the medical community’s definition. Id.
Then, the court stated how procedurally Georgia is in line with Atkins because it has used
the medical community’s definitions in its statutes but neglected mentioning or instructing
any changes that need to happen substantively due to the mistaken use of the standard up
to that point. Id. at 91, 860 S.E.2d at 771. The court therefore determined that the
substantive clarifications in Moore and Hall do not effect Georgia since Georgia
procedurally has followed the medical community’s definitions. Id. at 92, 860 S.E.2d at 771.
83. 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
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procedurally analogous to a claim of incompetence to stand trial than
insanity and should be treated as such.84
Before Moore, Texas relied on a seven-factor test of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals’s own creation.85 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
findings of mental disability based on the court’s invented tests do not
sufficiently protect the mentally disabled.86 Florida law before Hall
prevented those who wished to present evidence for mental disability
unless their IQ tested below seventy, determining that anyone with an
IQ higher than seventy automatically could not be considered mentally
disabled.87 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that though the statute

84. Young, 312 Ga. at 92–94 860 S.E.2d at 771, 773; Brief for Appellant at 103–04,
Young v. State, 860 S.E.2d 746 (2021) (No. S21P0078).
85. Bobby James Moore shot and killed a store clerk during a robbery and was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044. As a youth, Moore
struggled with basic math, measurements, the telling of time, and reading and writing. Id.
at 1045. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) used the guidelines it had
established in Ex Parte Briseno and determined Moore’s execution would not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1044. The TCCA set this Briseno standard as an attempt to
incorporate the prohibition in Atkins. Id. at 1046–47. The definition it set departed from
the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) because the clinical definitions include those who are mildly mentally
disabled, though not necessarily beyond improvement with professional assistance. Id. at
1051. The TCCA suggested there was not a “Texas consensus” among its citizenry that
would consider all the same mentally disabled as defined in the DSM as the ones intended
to be protected by Atkins and opted instead to use the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR). Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6–7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The
AAMR characterizes someone with mental disability as someone with (1) “‘significantly
subaverage’ general intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’ limitations in
adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs prior to age of 18.” Id. at 7. The TCCA
paired that definition with seven factors it does not cite from any source for courts to use
when weighing the evidence, reasoning that it would help courts navigate the divide
between those who are diagnosable and those who are mentally disabled for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 8–9; Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046. The Moore court ruled, as in Hall,
that the factors developed in the Briseno case created “an unacceptable risk that persons
with intellectual disability will be executed” because they were drawn from neither the
medical community nor Atkins. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051, 1053.
86. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044.
87. Freddie Lee Hall kidnapped, beat, raped, and murdered Karol Hurst while she was
pregnant and then killed Lonnie Coburn at a convenience store soon after. Hall, 572 U.S.
at 704. Hall’s teachers had identified him as mentally disabled, previous counsel compared
him to the lawyer’s four-year-old daughter, medical professionals testified that he was
significantly disabled with the understanding of a toddler, and his family recognized early
his slow learning and difficulty talking. Id. at 705–06. Despite those facts, Hall’s IQ tested
at seventy-one and Florida’s threshold for intellectual disability was seventy or below to be
allowed to present additional evidence of mental disability. Id. at 707. On appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that the Florida statute on its face could be
interpreted as consistent with Atkins and the views of the medical community. Id. at 711.
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appeared in line with Atkins on its face, it was being interpreted too
narrowly and rigidly and, thus, missed the logic of Atkins’ Eighth
Amendment protections.88
Nevertheless, the court quickly dismissed Young’s first argument in a
single paragraph, stating that Moore and Hall only apply to questions on
substantive definitions of intellectual disability.89 The U.S. Supreme
Court in those cases held that courts must substantively define mental
disability in adherence to clinical definitions and the court in Young
states that these cases are, therefore, inapplicable because Georgia
“indisputably does[.]”90
It is this point where several justices, in both concurrence and dissent,
expressed doubt about the logic of the lead opinion of Justice Melton.
Presiding Justice Nahmias writes in his concurrence, and on behalf of
Justice Boggs and Justice Peterson, that the Hall and Moore decisions
certainly cast doubts on the standard but recognizes that it is dangerous
to “evolve” the law based on reasoning from the U.S. Supreme Court
rather than its holdings.91 Justice Bethel dissents and instead agrees
with Young’s contention that the Hall and Moore decisions show that the
reasoning behind the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Stripling
and Hill is analogous to the reasoning and procedures that were struck
down in Texas and Florida, which now compel a different conclusion
here.92 Justice Melton, however, swiftly disagreed and moved on to the
next point.
However, the way the Florida Supreme Court had interpreted it was too narrow to regard
the IQ score as dispositive and neglected other significant factors contrary to experts’
processes. Id. at 711–12. In response to Florida’s argument that Atkins left to the states the
development of appropriate enforcement, a holding shared by Young, the Court responded
that in fact Atkins provided substantial guidance in its logic. Id. at 720–21. “If the States
were to have complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s
decision in Atkins could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human
dignity would not become a reality.” Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, struck the
Florida statute as unconstitutional in its narrow rigidity. Id. at 723.
88. It was not enough of a justification to say that Atkins had left procedural and
substantive guidelines to the states when Florida’s statute threatened to nullify the Eighth
Amendment as defined in Atkins. Hall, 572 U.S. at 711, 720-21.
89. Young, 312 Ga. at 92, 860 S.E.2d at 771.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 126–27, 129, 131, 860 S.E.2d at 793, 795–96 (Nahmias, J., concurring
specially).
92. Id. at 131, 860 S.E.2d at 796 (Bethel, J., dissenting). Justice Bethel further notes
that a juror who was probably or clearly convinced that a person was mentally disabled
would still be authorized to join in sentencing them to death. Id. at 133, 860 S.E.2d at 797.
While recognizing that all risk cannot be eliminated, the highest burden of proof greatly
increases the risk and limits the protection to those who suffer profound mental disabilities.
Id. at 132–33, 860 S.E.2d at 797.
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In answer to the second argument, the court maintains its consistency
with its previous decisions—namely, that mental disability is more akin
to insanity than incompetence to stand trial.93 The relevant procedural
difference between insanity and incompetence to stand trial is that the
U.S. Supreme Court held that courts could require the insane to prove
their insanity beyond a reasonable doubt without violating the
constitution, but could not require those claiming incompetence to prove
it by more than by a preponderance of the evidence.94
The court analyzed these propositions from two U.S. Supreme Court
cases, Leland v. Oregon95 containing the holding on insanity, and Cooper
v. Oklahoma96 containing the holding on incompetence to stand trial.97
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that while both cases are
comparable and neither is a perfect fit to guilty but mentally disabled,
Leland was a better guide.98 The rights in controversy in both these cases
and Young are established as constitutional rights to some degree; Young
and Cooper involve rights the Court considers fundamental and Leland’s
is not a right secured in the Bill of Rights but was an acceptable definition
by the Constitution.99 Cooper is comparable in that incompetence to
stand trial and guilty but mentally disabled both involve a danger of
potentially erroneous sentencing, but Leland is comparable in that both
insanity and mental disability relieve someone found to be guilty of some
amount of the penalty.100
Both incompetence and insanity have some historical, though
contrasting, basis: incompetence to stand trial has a history of protecting
defendants from being required to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard; insanity pleas, on the other hand, historically were required to
meet a high standard of proof, to “clearly prove” their insanity; mental

93. Id. at 96–97, 860 S.E.2d at 774 (majority opinion). Insanity is a defense that
eliminates culpability as an element of a crime, meaning, if proved, the defendant would
not be found guilty of that crime. Cornell Law School, Insanity Defense, LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/insanity_defense (last visited
Sept. 23, 2021). Proof of mental disability still admits guilt to the crime but finds less
culpability and so changes a sentence from the death penalty to life in prison. Id. A person
found incompetent to stand trial simply cannot be tried or convicted. Id.
94. Young, 312 Ga. at 89, 860 S.E.2d at 769.
95. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
96. 517 U.S. 348 (1996); Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1013 (11th Cir. 2019).
97. Young, 312 Ga. at 92–93, 860 S.E.2d at 771.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 93, 96, 860 S.E.2d at 772, 773–74; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355 (holding that trying
someone who is incompetent offends fundamental principles of justice rooted deep in
traditions and the conscience of the people).
100. Young, 312 Ga. at 93, 96–97, 860 S.E.2d at 772, 774.
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disability is a relatively new plea without direct historical cues either
way.101 Another quality all three share is that the number of states
requiring defendants to establish them beyond a reasonable doubt is very
small. Oregon was, at the time of Leland, the only state to require the
highest burden of proof for insanity and Oklahoma is only one of four
states to require the highest burden of proof for incompetence to stand
trial.102 The difference, however, is that the U.S. Supreme Court found
the near uniformity in standards of proof in incompetence cases to be
indicative of the traditions and conscience of the people and thus did not
allow the Oklahoma courts to depart from them.103 But in Leland, the
Court held that the low number was perhaps worth considering but not
dispositive and that the mere existence of wiser or fairer methods does
not make Oregon’s method a violation of due process rights.104
Despite Young’s urging that Cooper is the more appropriate case, the
court in Young determined that Leland is simply more comparable and
persuasive than Cooper and held, as the Court in Leland did, that a
requirement to prove mental disability beyond a reasonable doubt does
not violate nationally accepted concepts of basic standards of justice.105
C. Left to the States
Superseding the court’s analysis of Cooper and Leland is the
proposition from Atkins that the court intentionally “‘l[eft] to the State(s)
the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the [federal]
constitutional restriction’” thus the court concludes it is within Georgia’s

101. Id. at 93–95, 860 S.E.2d at 772-73 (stating “the supervisory authority over the
federal courts, requir[e] an acquittal in federal prosecutions whenever ‘there is reasonable
doubt whether [the defendant] was capable in law of committing the crime’”). Leland relies
on the words “clearly proved” from the M’Naghten case (the seminal M’Naghten case
establishes a widely used insanity test) and language from a supervisory authority which
interprets the standard to mean beyond reasonable doubt. Leland, 343 U.S. at 796 (quoting
M’Naghten 10 Cl. & Fin 200 (H.L.,1843)). The quoted language from M’Naghten goes on to
describe such persons that are to be judged under the standard as being so insane as to not
understand the character or gravity of their actions. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court held
that the test’s purpose is to determine whether the criminal is so diseased that they could
not form a plan or the intent to kill. Id. at 795. These are the same type of criteria described
in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1988, which allowed the death of Johnny Penry. Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4181, 4390. In contrast, the Atkins case relaxed the criteria of
inclusion in the protected group with mental disabilities and requires states to develop
procedural tests to ensure that every degree of mentally disabled individuals are in fact
protected. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
102. Young, 312 Ga. at 93, 95, 860 S.E.2d at 772–73; Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1013–14.
103. Young, 312 Ga. at 93–94, 860 S.E.2d at 772.
104. Id. at 95–96, 860 S.E.2d at 773.
105. Id. at 92–93, 96, 860 S.E.2d at 771, 773.
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discretion to develop procedures that ensure the mentally disabled are
being properly identified and protected from the death penalty.106
This proposition is quoted in Atkins from Ford v. Wainwright,107 a
death penalty case from 1986. Here the court in Young demonstrated
that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard fits into this criterion with,
for the first time since this standard has been in dispute, an in-depth
discussion on Ford.108 Though the quoted language from Ford, which
Atkins quoted to allow the states to develop procedures themselves, is
only agreed to by a plurality, the court determined the reasoning behind
the statement would still support the conclusion made here.109
Alvin Ford was examined, per state policy, by three psychiatrists
together for thirty minutes each in front of the Governor, his counsel, and
the State’s counsel; all three psychiatrists gave their analyses to the
Governor, who made the decision on whether Ford was competent.110 The
Court said this method failed to protect Ford’s constitutional interests by
any stretch.111 But, even in light of Florida’s failure, the Court still left
the task of developing proper procedures to the states.112 Because
Georgia’s procedures are not, according to the court in Young, remotely
as grievous and its procedures more restricted, it reasons the U.S.
Supreme Court would still agree here to continue to allow Georgia to
expect the mentally disabled to prove their disability beyond a reasonable
doubt.113
A standard of proof is not mentioned in Ford, but given that the Court
was aware of the risk to the mentally disabled and the fact that the
Governor was unrestrained in whatever standard they were employing,
the court in Young reasons that the Court in Ford would have included
106. Id. at 97, 860 S.E.2d at 774.
107. 477 U.S. 399, 399, 416 (1986). “If the states were to have complete autonomy to
define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins would become a
nullity and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not become a
reality.” Hall, 572 U.S. at 720–21. Ford came at a time ten years after the moratorium
ended and almost two decades before Atkins when death sentencing was at one of its alltime peaks and no legislation yet existed protecting the mentally disabled from execution
at all. The History of the Death Penalty: A Timeline, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/history-of-the-death-penalty-timeline (last visited Nov.
18, 2021); The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (Dec. 14, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/dpicyear-end-reports/the-death-penalty-in-2018-year-end-report.
108. Young, 312 Ga. at 97–100, 860 S.E.2d at 774–77.
109. Id. at 98, 860 S.E.2d at 775 (discussing the difficulties Ford and Atkins pose).
110. Ford, 477 U.S. at 412–13.
111. Id. at 413.
112. Id. at 416–17; Young, 312 Ga. at 99, 860 S.E.2d at 775.
113. Young, 312 Ga. at 98, 100, 860 S.E.2d at 775–76.
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restrictions on a standard of proof if it thought it were necessary to avoid
results like Ford.114 The Ford concurring opinion asserted that the
blanket of freedom was too much and that courts should be bound by
some procedures, for example an impartial board that can receive
evidence and perform their own examinations.115
Overall, the court in Young concludes that the task at hand is not to
judge the wisdom of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof from
a policy perspective, but to determine if Georgia’s use of the standard is
unconstitutional.116 Because Young failed to show otherwise, the
judgment below was affirmed and the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof for mentally disabled defendants facing the death
penalty still stands.117
V. IMPLICATIONS
Current procedures in Georgia present a similar risk of error to the
mentally disabled as in Texas and Florida before the ruling of Moore and
Hall. And, like both Moore and Hall, when Young appeals to the U.S.
Supreme Court,118 there is a reasonable chance the Court will overturn
the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in order to ensure the mandated
protection of the mentally disabled.
If the appeal fails, Georgia will continue to be the most difficult state
for a capital defendant with a mental disability to claim a constitutional
right to not be executed and, therefore, the state most likely to execute
the mentally disabled. Most states set a preponderance of the evidence
standard and a few set the bar at clear and convincing.119 Georgia is the
only state that has the beyond a reasonable doubt standard imposed on
the defendant to prove mental disability.120 Throughout the challenges to
Georgia’s standard of proof over the years, the dissents continue to echo
the point that the standard is insurmountable and thus not protecting

114. Id. at 99–100, 860 S.E.2d at 775–76. As mentioned above, Ford was before any
legislation on the issue at all. Though there would have been plenty of public discussion at
this time no state had yet established any mandate, let alone a standard of proof, to debate
or a consensus on which to use or which standards could have damaging effects.
115. Ford, 477 U.S. at 427.
116. Young, 312 Ga. at 100, 860 S.E.2d at 776.
117. Id.
118. ACLU Statement on Georgia Supreme Court’s Decision In Rodney Young Case,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 1, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclustatement-georgia-supreme-courts-decision-rodney-young-case; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Young v. State, 312 Ga. 71, 860 S.E.2d 746 (Nov. 24, 2021).
119. Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1013-14.
120. Id. at 1013; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118, at 25.
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anyone and infringing on the categorical prohibition of Atkins.121 Those
fears have been confirmed.
Since the statute’s enactment and until at least 2019, not one single
capital defendant convicted of intentional murder has successfully
proved their mental disability beyond a reasonable doubt to protect them
from the death penalty.122 In contrast, 55% of capital defendants
nationally who attempt to prove mental disability under Atkins
succeed.123 This discrepancy reveals the reality of the standard’s effect on
Georgia’s at-risk population targeted by Atkins.
These results are analogous to the dangers presented in Moore and
Hall, which led to their overruling. After those rulings, the average
number of death sentences per year in both Texas and Florida have been
cut by more than half. Florida sentenced on average fifteen people a year
to death up to 2014, the year Hall was decided. After 2014, that average
dropped to six. In Texas, death sentences fluctuated a bit but averaged
at about nine per year, dropping to four after 2014.124 While
attributability of the drops to the judicial shields for the mentally
disabled is not conclusive based on available data, there exists a
correlation indicative of a strong, reasonable inference.125

121. Stripling, 289 Ga. at 377, 711 S.E.2d at 671 (Benham, J., dissenting); Hill, 277 Ga.
at 272–73, 587 S.E.2d at 629 (Sears, J., dissenting); Young, 312 Ga. at 132, 860 S.E.2d at
797 (Bethel, J., dissenting); Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1009 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. Lucas, supra note 35, at 582; Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1009 (Jordan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Liptak, supra note 58.
123. Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1018 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing John H. Blume, et al., A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual
Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a
Categorical Bar, 23 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 397 (2014)).
124. Death Sentences in the United States Since 1977, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/sentencing-data/death-sentencesin-the-united-states-from-1977-by-state-and-by-year (last visited Nov. 18 2021). There are
likely many factors at play with these declines, but homicides in both Texas and Florida
have only increased since 2014, so it is not likely be attributable to fewer capital crimes.
National Center for Healthcare Statistics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/homicide_mortality/homicide.htm.
125. Trends in national statistical data unquestionably show the evolving standards of
society about the death penalty generally, but they may also suggest a correlation between
the death penalty and mental disability and possibly, and more disturbingly, that the
mentally disabled have made up a significant portion of those being sentenced to death—
and not just in Texas and Florida. There is a large drop between 1999–2001 and since then
a steady decline nationwide. While it is unclear whether the drops around the time of Atkins
are due to the Atkins decision or other factors, it is likely to at least be a contributor. To
show the comparison in average sentencing and when precisely they trend down or drop,
the numbers below will reflect the number of people sentenced to death for the five years
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Overruling Young would allow similar effects on Georgia law as Texas
and Florida underwent as they realigned with Atkins. 126 Though
Georgia’s numbers are not as high as either Texas or Florida and its
noncompliance with Atkins more difficult to spot, the inconsistency is still
reflected in the numbers and its legal implications are effectively the
before (1998–2002) verses after (2003–2007) Atkins per state. Illinois: 7, 8, 9, 1, 6 vs. 2, 4,
1, 3, 3. Indiana: 3, 2, 2, 0, 4 vs. 1, 0, 1, 0, 0. Pennsylvania: 12, 15, 12, 6, 9 vs. 6, 5, 7, 4, 6.
Florida: 25, 20, 20, 15, 10 vs. 11, 9, 15, 18, 21. Louisiana: 9, 10, 9, 2, 7 vs. 1, 6, 4, 3, 1.
Arkansas: 4, 5, 3, 2, 0 vs. 0, 2, 2, 0, 2. North Carolina: 20, 24, 18, 14, 7 vs. 6, 4, 6, 5, 3.
Tennessee: 4, 6, 4, 3, 4, vs. 6, 3, 2, 1, 1. Texas: 39, 43, 31, 24, 14 vs. 29, 23, 14, 11, 14.
California: 31, 43, 31, 24, 14 vs. 19, 11, 23, 17, 10. Virginia: 9, 7, 8, 4, 3 vs. 6, 2, 1, 2, 1. New
Mexico has not sentenced anyone since 2002, the year of Atkins, New York since 2003, and
New Jersey and Wyoming since 2004.
After 2014, the year of both Moore and Hall, fourteen of the twenty-nine states that still
had the death penalty appear to have been significantly impacted by those decisions.
Florida, Washington, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Texas, and Washington all see significant drops in sentencing. This correlation is more
noticeable and suggestive than the declines after Atkins. Again, to show the drops in
average as well as the correlation to the year of Moore and Hall the numbers below will
show averages as well as decisions 2011–2014 verses 2015–2018. Pennsylvania dropped
from sentencing an average of 5 people per year to 1.3 (4, 6, 4, 4, vs. 2, 1, 2, 1.) Louisiana
dropped from 2.75 per year to .3 (5, 2, 0, 3 vs. 1, 0, 0, 1.) Mississippi dropped from 2 per year
to .83 (1, 2, 2, 1, vs. 1, 0, 1, 2.) North Carolina dropped from 3.1 to .6 (3, 0, 1, 3 vs. 0, 1, 0,
0.) Oregon has only sentenced one person since 2014. South Dakota, Kentucky, Indiana,
and Connecticut have not sentenced anyone since that year, Washington since the year
before, and Delaware since the year after. All states drop in sentencing during the 2000s,
though not all appear as clearly correlated with those two decisions.
The national total of those sentenced has decreased almost every year since 1998. Since
Atkins the number of people sentenced per year decreases at an average of thirteen less
each year—in 2015, after Hall and Moore, it dropped by twenty-four. The most significant
drops occurred between 1999 and 2001, right before Atkins, from 279 sentenced in 1999 and
only 153 in 2001. This suggests not only justification for the Court in Atkins taking its cues
from society but also that there were obviously other impactful factors besides society’s
views on mental disability that have taken effect. None the less, the correlations to years
of significant decisions tightening protection for the mentally disabled are hard to ignore.
This data is significant because it suggests that the mentally disabled were indeed being
sentenced to death before and still after Atkins and that changes like Moore and Hall are
actually efficacious in appropriately protecting some from the death penalty. And further,
this data suggests that some states implementation of Atkins still allowed for sentencing
many mentally disabled to death despite their claim to not disturb Atkins’s direction. Thus,
merely applying Atkins without the subsequent clarifications may not be enough to protect
the mentally disabled. It is unnervingly likely that the states whose decline in sentencing
after Moore and Hall were previously sentencing people with mental disabilities; after those
decisions there were simply fewer capital defendants left who were eligible. DEATH
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 124.
126. Incidentally, Texas has a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, set by the same
case the seven-factor test originated from, and Florida has a “clear and convincing”
standard. Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann
§ 921.137(4) (2021).
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same—that is, providing insufficient barriers against executing the
mentally disabled. Even with fewer death sentences, over thirty years
without protecting one capital defendant is telling.
Why does it make a difference if the numbers are all going down
anyways? It goes without saying that to those individuals it matters a
great deal. But beyond that there is no security that if the trend reversed,
as it has in the past, the mentally disabled would still be guaranteed their
constitutional right because the changes in Georgia’s numbers are not
attributable to legislation or caselaw.127 There are not droves of capital
defendants congesting death row as in the 90s, but as no legal protection
in Georgia has been heightened for them since the 80s, the mentally
disabled cannot rely on state law for protection.128 Though Georgia’s
sentencing per year has declined steadily with the rest of the country, it
is not because of the protection from the law but in spite of it.
Regardless of how the numbers play out, this burden of proof on capital
defendants is out of line with national consensus and does not reflect the
changes mandated by Atkins. Being rid of the procedural blockade could
encourage more capital defendants who suffer with mental disabilities to
receive the appropriate punishment for their crimes; accuracy will
improve, and Georgia can join the 55% of the rest of the country and the
beyond reasonable doubt standard can instead be retired to function in
the way it was intended.129
While the Young plurality dismisses this comparison because Georgia
has always relied on prevailing clinical standards to define mental
disability unlike Moore and Hall, this argument is obviously only
partially true, given that it admitted that at one time it was using this
standard of proof to “further served to define” the category.130 Regardless,
the data shows that the statute is not functioning as Atkins had intended.
Many believe Georgia is almost certainly executing some mentally
disabled in its attempt to ensure 100% proof positive of a diagnosis
experts agree is “exceedingly, [and] perhaps uniquely, ill-suited to proof

127. The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (Dec. 14, 2018), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/dpicyear-end-reports/the-death-penalty-in-2018-year-end-report.
128. Id.
129. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 118, at 25–26.
130. Where previously this court sided with the defense that the beyond reasonable
doubt standard “served to define the category of mental disability” it here rejects that
defense and instead accepts that the standard serves as a “way to enforce” the
constitutional restriction. Either way, there is little evidence to show the standard will not
perform the same function it has since the 80s. Stripling, 289 Ga. at 373, 711 S.E.2d at 668;
Young, 312 Ga. at 91–92, 860 S.E.2d at 771.
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beyond a reasonable doubt.”131 And further, that if a higher court does
not overrule the decision in Young, the beyond reasonable doubt standard
will become solidified in law and Georgia will remain in a state of
tortured irony as it easily condemns those it professes to protect with a
standard itself that will never die.

131. Brief for Appellant at 97, Young v. State, 312 Ga. 71, 860 S.E.2d 746 (2021) (No.
S21P0078). “Given that intellectual disability disputes will always involve conflicting
expert testimony, there will always be a basis for rejecting an intellectual disability claim.”
Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1016 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually
beyond reach in most situations. The reasonable-doubt standard of criminal law
functions in its realm because there the standard is addressed to specific,
knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent based on
medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the
experience of the diagnostician.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 430. “[T]he highly subjective nature of the inquiry into mental
retardation, mak[es] it even clearer that the reasonable doubt standard unquestionably will
result in the execution of those offenders that Atkins protects.” Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d
1335, 1372 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., Marcus, J., and Martin, J., dissenting).

